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An Efficient Algorithm for Locating Soft and Hard
Failures in WDM Networks
Carmen Mas and Patrick Thiran, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Fault identification and location in optical networks
is hampered by a multitude of factors: the redundancy and the
lack of coordination (internetworking) of the managements at
the different layers (WDM, SDH/SONET, ATM, IP); the large
number of alarms a single failure can trigger; the difficulty in
detecting some failures; and the resulting need to cope with
missing or false alarms. Moreover, the problem of multiple fault
location is NP-complete, so that the processing time may become
an issue for large meshed optical networks.
We propose an algorithm for locating multiple failures at the
physical layer of a WDM network. They can be either hard fail-
ures, that is, unexpected events that suddenly interrupt the estab-
lished channels; or soft failures, that is, events that progressively
degrade the quality of transmission; or both. Hard failures are
detected at the WDM layer. Soft failures can sometimes be de-
tected at the optical layer if proper testing equipment is deployed,
but often require performance monitoring at a higher layer (SDH,
ATM, or IP). Both types of failures, and both types of error moni-
toring, are incorporated in our algorithm, which is based on a clas-
sification and abstraction of the components of the optical layer
and of the upper layer. Our algorithm does not rely on timestamps
nor on failure probabilities, which are difficult to estimate and to
use in practice. Moreover, our algorithm also handles missing and
false alarms. The nonpolynomial computational complexity of the
problem is pushed ahead into a precomputational phase, which is
done off-line, when the optical channels are set up or cleared down.
This results in fast on-line location of the failing components upon
reception of the ringing alarms.
Index Terms—Fault location, lost and false alarms, multiple fail-
ures, optical networks, wavelength division multiplexing (WDM).
I. INTRODUCTION
THE RECENT explosion of Internet traffic has resulted inan evolution of backbone networks: from electrical to op-
tical; and, among the latter ones, from space division multi-
plexing (SDM) and time division multiplexing (TDM) to wave-
length division multiplexing (WDM). The evolution does not
imply that there has been a reassignment of management tasks
to other layers. On the contrary, the main drawback of today’s
networks is the existence of several management layers, each
having its own management routines. This is the case, for ex-
ample, with IP over (ATM over) SDH over WDM. Interoper-
ability is needed to speed up the process and avoid task dupli-
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cation. In particular, fault management is one of the most re-
dundant tasks because it is performed at all layers and could
be improved by cooperation between the different management
layers. Indeed, the manager of each layer receives different in-
formation about the network behavior. At the physical layer,
the manager receives information about the physical properties
of the network such as optical power and temperature of the
equipment. At the WDM layer, the manager obtains informa-
tion about the quality of the optical signals such as signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) and crosstalk from some testing equipment
such as spectrum analyzer [2], [3]. The manager at the upper
layers receives more detailed information about the quality of
the signal such as the bit error rate (BER), which is specific to
each transmission technology. When a failure occurs, each man-
ager tries to locate the failure based on the information obtained
at his/her layer. For example, with SDH (synchronous digital hi-
erarchy) over WDM links, an optical fiber break will trigger sev-
eral alarms at the optical and SDH layers [4], [5]. In this paper
we propose an algorithm that is able to cope with information
from several layers to locate the failure(s). It is tailored to optical
networks but is generic enough to be applied to existing net-
works using optical fibers that have several management layers
(IP/ATM/SDH/WDM), or to future networks. It is believed that
the SDH/SONET layer will always exist under some form until
a new generation of high speed switches, routers, and alterna-
tive transport systems emerge that will provide the same func-
tionality as SDH/SONET, but at the optical layer, and will allow
direct IP over WDM.
Different methods have been proposed for fault location in the
literature. They differ on the network model that is used (e.g.,
model based on the physical topology [6] or on the description
of the established channels [7]); on the information needed (e.g.,
probabilities [8]) as input for the algorithm; and on the informa-
tion processing methodology to locate the failures (e.g., finite
state machine [9] or artificial neural networks [10]). The goal
of all these methods is to identify the components whose failure
has caused the received alarms. Other algorithms achieve the
same goal by discarding redundant alarms. Our previous work
[11] describes an alarm filtering algorithm where the considered
failures are hard failures that are unexpected, sudden events that
cause the interruption of the transmission channel, such as an
optical fiber cut or a broken laser . The information obtained
from the network in all these methods is minimal (binary). For
example, a receiver sends an alarm when the power is below a
certain threshold and the content of the alarm will be “loss of
signal.”
Our goal is to identify and locate rapidly not only hard but
also soft failures that are the result of aging equipment or mis-
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alignments and provide much richer (nonbinary) information
(such as BER or SNR). Moreover, we must tolerate that some
alarms may be false and/or lost. For example, the existence of
thresholds may conceal a failure by not sending the expected
alarms because the threshold is set too high or, conversely, may
cause false alarms when the threshold is too low. At the same
time, the time to locate the failure(s) when new alarms reach
the manager must be kept as short as possible.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
signals available at different layers that provide information
about failures in an optical network. Section III first describes
the hardware components of an optical network whose po-
tential failures need to be identified, and then describes the
monitoring equipment that provides additional information
about the failures of the hardware components. The latter
includes both measurement devices at the optical layer and
performance monitoring functions implemented at higher
layers. This study of the behavior of the network components
and of the monitoring equipment results in a classification
that abstracts the failure location problem in Section IV, and
from which one can devise an efficient algorithm in Section
V. Three important features of our fault location algorithm
(FLA) are 1) the minimal diagnosis time, i.e., the time to locate
failures when the management function receives alarm(s);
2) the location of multiple, simultaneous failures; and 3) the
tolerance of false and lost alarms. Section VI shows results
of the application of the FLA to examples on an SDH/WDM
network; and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. AVAILABLE FAILURE INDICATIONS IN AN
OPTICAL NETWORK
This section describes the signals that can notify about fail-
ures in an optical network. Some signals contain only binary in-
formation, such as the indication of “loss of signal” in a receiver
or “temperature out of range” in a laser, and they are issued when
a failure occurs. Others are analog or may take a large range of
discrete values, such as the bit error rate (BER), and they are
usually sent periodically to the manager.
The physical layer provides binary alarms informing about
either an internal problem of the equipment or a problem with
the incoming signal. The WDM layer can provide the following
analog information: distribution of power of individual carriers
over the full bandwidth, channel wavelength, signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR), and crosstalk. Signals from the WDM layer are
not sufficient to locate all the progressive failures because they
do not give enough information about the transmission quality.
For example, if the SNR is low, it means that there has been a
system error, but the contrary is not always true. The decisive
parameter that determines the transmission quality of a system
is the BER that is dependent on transmission technology. As-
suming that the transmission technologies are known, BER can
either be measured by a network tester or be delivered by the
higher layers such as SDH through parity check, Ethernet by
CRC computation or TCP/IP through the checksum, etc.
The management information can reach the manager either
through a management network independent of the data net-
work and assumed to be reliable, or through the data network
itself, which is assumed to be a protected network allowing the
manager to receive most of the alarms through alternative paths
when failures occur.
III. OPTICAL NETWORK COMPONENTS
We distinguish two classes of network components. The first
one, described in Subsection A, contains the hardware compo-
nent whose failure needs to be identified because it will degrade
or interrupt the channels. The second one, described in Sub-
section B, contains the monitoring equipment that is present at
one or more layers and provides additional information about
the transmission quality. Their failure does not interrupt the
channel, and the second part of this section focuses only on the
information that they can provide about soft failures occurring
in the hardware network components. We do not seek to locate
failures at layers other than the physical.
A. Hardware Components of the Optical Layer
This subsection briefly reviews the hardware components
found in optical networks, along with the most common
information they can deliver to the manager. This information
depends on the software that controls them. A more detailed
description can be found in [11].
• Optical Fibers (OFs) are the medium for transmitting op-
tical signals between two points. They offer low attenu-
ation, low cost, and the capability of transmitting simul-
taneously several information channels at different wave-
lengths. They cannot communicate with the manager.
• Transmitters (Txs) are lasers or laser arrays that convert the
electrical signal into an optical signal at a certain wave-
length. The resolution of the laser limits the spacing be-
tween the different wavelengths of the different channels,
and hence the number of channels in WDM networks.
New lasers used in advanced WDM networks are tunable
and can change the emission wavelength within a pre-
scribed range [12].
Transmitters send alarms when either the temperature
or the incoming power is beyond a prescribed range. If the
analog value of these variables could be retrieved as such,
a more proactive fault management of the laser would be
possible. In this work, we have considered transmitters
sending binary alarms and analog information when re-
quested by the manager. In case the transmitters are able
to continuously send analog information instead of binary
alarms, they can be considered as pieces of both hardware
and monitoring equipment.
• Receivers (Rxs) convert an optical signal, which corre-
sponds to a certain wavelength, into an electrical signal.
They send alarms when the input optical power is under
an accepted level.
• Add-Drop Filters (ADFs) are able to drop and add a certain
wavelength to an optical signal with several wavelengths
without distorting the other wavelengths.
• 3Rs (Regenerator/Reshaper/Retimer) are framers able to
amplify the electrical signal, give the original shape of the
signal, and readjust the time interval between pulses. They
send alarms when they cannot lock to the incoming signal.
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• Protection Switches receive more than one optical signal,
and select one of them that has an acceptable power level.
They send an alarm when they change the switch position
due to an unacceptable incoming optical power.
• Multiplexers (MUXs) and demultiplexers (DEMUXs) are
able to pass from several optical signals at different wave-
lengths into one optical signal that contains all the wave-
lengths, and vice versa.
• Switches allow cross-connection, that is, the connection of
a particular input with a particular output. An alarm is sent
when the connection cannot be established.
• Amplifiers output a signal at a higher power level than the
input signal. Optical amplifiers do not perform conversion
to electrical signal before amplifying. Most of the ampli-
fiers add distortion to the signal.
B. Additional Equipment Sensitive to Progressive Failures
The alarms provided by the physical layer are sufficient to lo-
cate hard failures, but not soft ones. This information is provided
either by performance monitoring at higher layers or, whenever
available, by WDM monitoring equipment. The latter are de-
scribed in Subsection 1, the former in Subsection 2 for SDH,
and in Subsection 3 for performance equipment at other layers.
We briefly indicate how ATM and TCP/IP provide similar infor-
mation in Subsection 3. We refer to all the equipment as moni-
toring components.
1) WDM Measurement Equipment: Devices directly mea-
suring the quality of the optical signal can be divided into the
two following categories:
• Individual Testing Equipment (ITE) designates a device
that can measure parameters of a single channel, that is,
of a single wavelength. An example is the network tester
ANT-20 [2], which can calculate the BER of a given
channel and display the results. The drawback of mea-
suring and relying on the BER is that in order to compute
it, the testing equipment must be aware of the transmis-
sion technology (ATM, SONET, SDH, etc.). This detailed
knowledge of the upper layer should be avoided since one
of the advantages of WDM networks is the transparency
with respect to the transmission technologies used.
• Group Testing Equipment (GTE) measures the quality of
the overall optical signal, which includes the used wave-
lengths, the maximum power at each wavelength, and the
SNR of each channel. Examples of these equipments are
the spectrum analyzers (for example, OSP-102A [2] or
MON-001 [3]).
2) SDH/SONET Equipment: Synchronous digital hierarchy
(SDH) and synchronous optical network (SONET) comprise a
set of network interface standards and multiplexing schemes de-
veloped to support the adoption of optical fiber as a transmission
medium. SDH is the European standard and SONET is the U.S.
counterpart. The main difference between SONET and SDH is
that SDH adds additional network management information to
each data frame. For simplicity, we refer only to SDH, but the
concepts apply to SONET as well. SDH works on three levels: i)
regenerator section layer (RS layer), which deals with retiming
and reshaping of frames; ii) multiplex section layer (MS layer),
Fig. 1. SDH channel example.
which performs the multiplexing and demultiplexing operation;
and iii) path layer, which takes care of the transport assembly.
Transmission performance is provided by parameters based
on the detection defects and on the ratio of errored blocks (EB).
A block is a set of consecutive bits monitored by means of an
error detection code: the bit interleaved parity (BIP) which is a
special case of the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) with polyno-
mial of (for BIP- ) [13]. The BIP- used at each layer
are: BIP-8 at the RS layer, BIP-24N at the MS layer (where N is
the number of basic STMs in one frame and which can be equal
to 1,4, 16, or 64) and either BIP-2 or BIP-8 at the path layer,
depending on the frame. The BIP result is stored in the B-bytes
of the frame header. Three kinds of different SDH elements can
be distinguished (see Fig. 1).
• Regenerator Section Terminating Element (RSTE) is the
element which originates/terminates a regenerator section
(RS). At an RSTE, the BIP-8 is computed over all bits
of the previous frame and stored in the B1 byte of the
following frame. The next RSTE checks the byte parity
of the preceding frame and detects errored blocks. Before
retransmitting the frame on the next RS, the value of the
B1 byte is updated to recover the correct parity, thereby
masking any detected error in the frame from the next
RSTE.
• Multiplex Section Terminating Element (MSTE) origi-
nates/terminates a multiplex section (MS). In the SDH
layering, every MSTE covers both the RS and MS layers.
The error monitoring function at the RS layer is that
of an RSTE, while the error monitoring function at the
MS layer is performed by a BIP-24N code using even
parity, as defined in G.707 [14]. At one MSTE and at the
MS layer, the BIP-24N is computed over all bits (except
those in the regenerator overhead) of the previous frame
and placed in the N respective B2 positions of the
multiplex overhead of the following frame. At the next
MSTE, BIP-24N code is computed for the received frame
and they are compared to the N error monitoring
B2 bytes recovered from the multiplex overhead [15]
of the next frame. A difference between both values is
an evidence of an errored block. Before retransmitting
the frame, bytes B2 are updated, thereby masking any
detected error in the frame from the next MSTE.
• Path Terminating Element (PTE) originates/terminates a
path. Its BIP is stored in the B3 bytes of the header. This
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is the last parity check before delivering the frame to the
upper layers.
3) Other Monitoring Equipments: Let us briefly mention
some possible monitoring functionalities at higher layers.
• At the IP layer, routers can be considered as monitoring
equipment since they perform a header checksum before
retransmitting the packets.
• At the TCP and UDP layers, the kernels of the end systems
can be considered as monitoring equipment since they per-
form a checksum of data and header before accepting a
packet.
• In ATM, there is a CRC-10 error-detecting code at the trail
termination that uses a common cell payload format.
• In submarine cables, a forward error control (FEC) mecha-
nism is used to control the errors in a heavily used point-to-
point WDM system [16].
C. Properties of Alarms
We now study the behavior of the network elements when a
failure occurs:
• When a hard (or sudden) failure occurs, such as a fiber
cut or the turnoff of a transmitter, the generated alarms are
signals from both the hardware components and the moni-
toring equipment. Depending on the location of the latter,
measurements may help to locate the hard failure better
than just the binary alarms from the hardware equipment
[17].
• Soft or progressive failures, such as the shift of a filter
curve, do not cause binary signals from the hardware com-
ponents but an increase/decrease of the involved measured
analog signals. These analog signals can be associated to
one or to all the transmitted channels. For example, if the
curve of an ADF gets shifted, the quality of the signal at
the output of the filter and in other further equipment will
degrade. The FLA should be able to detect that there is a
problem, and to locate the failure.
1) Alarming Properties of the Hardware Components: Let
us define the different alarming properties of the network com-
ponents based on their behavior when a failure occurs. The three
following features can be distinguished.
Self-Alarmed: This property specifies whether a network
component is able to send an alarm informing about its own
hard failure or not. An example of a self-alarmed component
is a transmitter whose microcontroller controls power and tem-
perature, and sends an alarm whenever one of these parameters
exceeds a given threshold.
Out-Alarmed: This property applies to the components
that communicate with the manager and send alarms about
a hard failure external to them. For example, receivers are
able to detect that there is no incoming power and to send the
corresponding alarm to the manager even if they themselves
are working correctly. On the contrary, multiplexers are unable
to detect whether some inputs are missing, therefore they are
not out-alarmed components.
Hard Failure Masking (HF Masking): This property spec-
ifies whether the network component masks the hard failure to
the hardware components that follow it on the channel. For ex-
ample, the laser of a transmitter sends power even if there is no
incoming signal (due to a hard failure of some component lo-
cated before the laser). Therefore, any out-alarmed component
located after this transmitter on the channel will not send any
alarm because it will keep receiving power, even if it does not
receive data any more.
2) Alarming Properties of the Monitoring Equipment: All
monitoring equipment is out-alarmed and sensitive to the quality
of the signal. Therefore, they all possess the property of soft
failure sensitivity. They differ, however, in their ability to mask
failures to other monitoring equipment.
Failure Masking: This property specifies whether the
monitoring equipment masks the failure to any other mon-
itoring equipment of its own layer or not. For example, a
WDM spectrum analyzer does not mask any failure to the next
measuring equipment because it does not act on the content of
the signal. On the contrary, an SDH MSTE masks progressive
failures from MSTE and RSTE because it updates the header
of the retransmitted frame so that the next MSTE or RSTE will
not be able to detect any failure. It does not mask from PTE
because the associated B3-byte remains intact.
D. Optical Network Components Classification
1) Hardware Components Classification: We can now
check which of the three properties of Section III-C-1 applies to
each hardware component. The properties of each component
may change depending on the type of component. The classi-
fication proposed in this section is based on the components
described in Section III-A. The properties of Table I enable us
to classify the components in the following categories.
1) The “nonalarming” components do not give any infor-
mation to the manager because they do not have any mi-
crocontroller. They are denoted by and they are repre-
sented by a circle on the figures.
2) The “alarming” components are able to communicate
with the manager because they have some programmable
software on the computer that controls the equipment.
This group contains three subgroups.
a) The components are the self-alarmed compo-
nents that do not mask any kind of failure. They
are represented on the figures by a square.
b) The components are the out-alarmed compo-
nents. They are represented by a triangle.
c) The components are the components that are
self-alarmed and mask previous hard failures. They
are represented by a pentagon.
If a component has both self- and out-alarmed properties, it
will be represented by a tandem of an element followed by
an element. This is the case for an optical amplifier.
2) Monitoring Equipment Classification: Monitoring
equipment is also classified according to its failure masking
property, resulting in the classification of Table II. Let
denote the class of all monitoring components. An com-
ponent, where , is a monitoring component that masks
soft failures to other monitoring components such that
, and such that follow it on the same channel.
components do not mask any failure and are represented by a
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TABLE I
ALARM PROPERTIES OF THE NETWORK COMPONENTS AND THE RESULTING CLASSIFICATION
TABLE II
MASKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MONITORING COMPONENTS AND THE
RESULTING CLASSIFICATION. THE YES/NO ENTRY INDICATES WHETHER THE
ELEMENT LISTED AT THE LEFT OF THE CONSIDERED ROW MASKS FAILURES
OR NOT FROM THE ELEMENT AT THE TOP OF THE CONSIDERED COLUMN
rhombus. SDH will introduce and components,
that will be represented, respectively, by a thick square, a thick
square with an oblique line, and a thick square with a cross.
Table II shows which monitoring piece of equipment masks
failures from another piece, and the resulting classification.
IV. PROBLEM ABSTRACTION
The classification of the previous section enables us to de-
rive and implement the FLA to locate the component(s) whose
failure has caused the alarms received by the manager.
A. Alarm Mismatching Thresholds
Some sets of received alarms may remain unexplained by
any combination of faulty components. This means that at least
one alarm was lost or false. To cope with this, we introduce
two alarm mismatching thresholds, which are two parameters
that reflect the reliability of the management channel and of the
management functions of the equipment. They are denoted by
and , and give the maximum number of lost and false
alarms, respectively, that are tolerated. We will refer to the sce-
nario where all the alarms are correctly issued and retrieved (no
alarms are lost or false) as the ideal scenario. In this case, one
takes of course . The value of and can
be set a priori by the network manager. The availability to cope
with the nonideal scenario is of crucial importance, as supported
by the following examples.
• When an element fails, it may not send the alarm it
is supposed to. For example, a switch having an internal
failure may not be able to send the expected alarm (be-
cause the failed board is turned off) and, therefore, its
alarm will be considered as a lost alarm.
• At the physical layer, the alarms are binary, but some of
them are obtained by thresholding analog values such as
“power out of range.” This can lead to errors, for example,
a false alarm being sent when no problem has occurred.
• At the SDH, IP, or ATM layers, there is a mechanism that
checks whether there has been an error at the bit level.
This mechanism (for example, BIP for SDH or CRC for
ATM) may leave errors undetected. The alarms that were
expected under the failure conditions will be considered
as lost.
• When establishing a new channel, transient conditions
may prompt an element to send an alarm, although no
failure has occurred. The alarm will be considered as a
false alarm.
B. Inputs of the Algorithm
The objects manipulated by the FLA are the following.
• Component comp is a network component that belongs
to one of the aforementioned categories. It has an identi-
fier with two fields: the first specifies the category and the
second identifies the component within the category. The
set of network components is denoted by and its cardi-
nality by .
• Alarm is an object with two fields: the first is the
identifier of the component, which issued the alarm, and
the second is the informational content of the alarm. The
information is relevant only for alarms issued by a mon-
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itoring component, because they give either an analog
value (for example BER) or a binary value (such as BIP-8
mismatch at the RSTE) informing about soft failures.
• Channel comp is an ordered list of compo-
nents. The channels are considered here as unidirectional.
Bidirectional channels are equivalent to a pair of unidi-
rectional channels. Function comp returns the
position of comp within the channel if comp belongs
to this channel, and 0 otherwise.
The inputs of the algorithm are: the set of established chan-
nels , which is updated every time a channel is established,
modified, or cleared down; the set of alarms received by the
manager and the mismatching thresholds and .
C. Domain Definition
Domain(comp) is defined as the set of network elements that
will send an alarm when comp fails. Two different kinds of Do-
main can be distinguished for every network component based
on the nature of the failure: HDomain when comp suffers a hard
failure and SDomain when comp suffers a soft failure. The com-
putation of the domains of each network component makes use
of the three following functions.
1) If an element suffers a hard failure, an out-alarmed
component of any established channel will send
an alarm if both of them belong to the same channel and
if there is no element between them. Mathematically
it can be expressed by the Boolean relation
if and only if
with
with
(1)
2) If an element suffers a hard or a soft failure, a moni-
toring element of any established channel will
notice the problem if both elements belong to the same
channel, if the monitoring element follows the failing one,
and if there is no other monitoring element that masks the
failure from . Mathematically this can be expressed as
follows:
if and only if
for some
with
if then with
else with
(2)
3) An element will send an alarm when it fails if it is
self-alarmed, that is,
if and only if (3)
Based on these relations, we can define HDomain and SDomain
as follows.
• HDomain is the set of elements whose alarms are ex-
pected when suffers a hard failure. These elements
are i) itself if , ii) the compo-
nents that follow in at least one channel and do not
have any component between them and , and fi-
nally iii) the monitoring components taking into account
their failure masking properties of Table II. Mathemati-
cally, HDomain can be expressed as follows:
HDomain
or
or (4)
• SDomain is the set of elements whose alarms are ex-
pected when suffers a soft failure. These elements are
the monitoring equipments that follow and which are
not masked by any other monitoring equipment. Mathe-
matically, SDomain can be expressed as follows:
SDomain (5)
V. FAULT LOCATION ALGORITHM (FLA)
Time to locate the failure(s) is critical, and the FLA must lo-
cate failures as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, the multiple
fault location problem has been shown to be NP-complete al-
ready in the ideal scenario [1]. Nevertheless, the computation
that has to be carried out when a new alarm reaches the man-
ager can be kept short despite the potentially large size of the
network, if we follow Rao’s approach to precompute, as much
as possible, the functions that can be executed independently of
the received alarms. This phase is called precomputation phase
(PCP). Once the manager starts receiving alarms from the net-
work, the algorithm does not have to perform complex compu-
tations but must simply traverse a binary tree. The precompu-
tation phase of the algorithm is executed only when the set of
channels is updated, not when the alarms are received. This
minimizes the time the algorithm needs to deliver results to the
manager when failures occur.
The precomputation phase has been implemented on the basis
of the algorithm devised by Rao [18], to locate single failures in
a network with two kinds of network components ( and ) in
the ideal scenario. We have extended this algorithm to the three
categories of network components presented in Section III-D,
to multiple failures, and finally to the nonideal scenario.
Let us present each of the extensions of the algorithm, step
by step. The final scheme of FLA is presented in Fig. 2.
A. FLA to Locate Single Failures in the Ideal Scenario
1) The Network has Only and Components: We first
solve the problem of locating a single hard failure within a net-
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Fig. 2. FLA scheme: the precomputation phase (PCP) gathers most of the complexity and leaves few processing steps to be carried out in the FLA core.
Fig. 3. A simple network example to introduce the algorithm.
work with two kinds of network components: and com-
ponents. In this case, when a component fails, the “alarming”
components that follow it on a channel will send an alarm. In
this section we assume only single, hard failures.
The steps of this algorithm are illustrated by the ex-
ample of Fig. 3 where three channels have been established
. We denote by the com-
ponents, and by the components. There are 9 passive
elements and 4 active elements which are
and . The consists of the following modules.
1) Compute the domain of each element of the established
channels. On the example you obtain:
HDomain HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain
2) Group the identical domains into equivalence classes
( ). Here , and the classes are:
HDomain HDomain
HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain HDomain
HDomain
HDomain HDomain
The domains of , and are empty, so the failure of
these elements cannot be detected.
Fig. 4. Binary tree of the example presented in Fig. 3.
3) Associate to each a binary vector with
as many elements as alarming and monitoring compo-
nents (this example, components) in the established
channels. If we denote the number of alarming and mon-
itoring components by , the vectors are therefore bi-
nary -uples. The th component of is
equal to 1 if the th element belongs to , and to 0
otherwise. Each component of the binary vector is associ-
ated to one “alarming” component according to the order
of the channel establishment. In our example, the binary
vectors attached to each class are
We will see later that these vectors generate a set of
binary vectors which can be regarded as a nonlinear code.
4) A binary tree is built with a depth equal to the number of
active components and whose leaves correspond to dif-
ferent binary combinations. Occupied leaves point to the
set whose corresponding is the path from
the root of the tree to the leaves. Fig. 4 presents the binary
tree of our example.
These steps can be precomputed off-line before receiving
any alarm so that the major computational complexity is placed
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in this module. Once the manager receives alarms , a
simple step has to be performed: is computed, and the
binary tree is traversed from the root to the corresponding leaf.
For example, if the manager receives alarms from and ,
and the leaf that will be reached points to
: is therefore the only faulty candidate.
2) The Network has All Categories of Components (P, A1, A2,
A3, M): The modules of the algorithm are the same as the ones
in the previous section with the distinction that, for each com-
ponent, two different domains HDomain and SDomain have to
be computed based on (4) and (5). will therefore contain
two fields: the first is the set of elements whose Domain is ,
the second is the indication of the nature (hard or soft) of the
failure:
comp with comp FDomain comp
and or (6)
B. FLA to Locate Multiple Failures in the Ideal Scenario
Let us now consider the case where several failures may
happen in a short interval of time so that the alarms reaching
the manager are intermingled. The algorithm has to be able to
distinguish the failures based on the received alarms. To solve
this problem, the domains of simultaneous failures have to be
computed.
We begin with double failures. Let Domain and
Domain , with or , be the domains to
two single failures of elements and , respectively; and let
and be their corresponding binary
vectors. Then, the domains of a double failure of and will
be , and the associated binary vector will be
(7)
where stands for the point-wise OR operation. The set
will therefore contain different sets of pairs whose fields are
comp : comp is an element whose domain is , is the
indication of the nature of the failure (if it is a hard failure then
, and if it is a soft failure then ). This translates
into the following equation:
(8)
If (7) returns a binary vector equal to one of the “generator”
vectors , , obtained for single failures, no action
is performed: we can reasonably assume that a single failure is
more likely than a multiple one, so that the occupied leaf points
to the more likely single failure. Conversely, if (7) returns a bi-
nary vector different from any of the existing generator vec-
tors , a new leaf is then occupied and points to the
double failure. Once all the new leaves corresponding to double
failures are filled, we proceed likewise for triple failures, etc. Let
be the set of all vectors obtained by these successive OR oper-
ations, to which we can adjoin the null vector ,
which corresponds to the absence of failure. We note that the set
has the property that for any , , the vectors ,
(9)
where . Note also, that if at some point of this pro-
cedure, there is a corresponding to a single failure which is
such that for all the already computed ’s,
or (10)
then will not contribute to any new leaf anymore. Therefore,
it need not be considered for further steps. This property allows
us to decrease the number of binary vectors corresponding to
single failures needed for computing the domains of multiple
ones. The process is finished when the set of single failures be-
comes empty. The output of this part of the algorithm in the
example presented in Fig. 3 is the following:
These vectors correspond to double failures. Some are identical
to those of single failures, but some others, with their binary
vector between parenthesis, are new and fill new leaves of the
binary tree, as shown in Fig. 5. Triple failures do not produce
new binary vectors and, hence, no further steps are done.
C. FLA to Locate Multiple Failures in the Nonideal Scenario
Note that in the previous example, some leaves of the binary
tree remain empty whatever the number of failures. If the
alarms received by the manager correspond to one of these
empty leaves, there must have been lost and/or false alarms.
In this case, which is the result that should be presented to the
human manager?
The tree can be viewed as a particular block error-correcting
code, whose codewords have the property that the logical OR of
any two codewords is another codeword. One empty leaf of the
tree corresponds to an erroneous word, and the error correction
would be to replace it with the codeword whose Hamming dis-
tance with the received word is minimal. Note at this point that
this code is not linear, and that it will have very poor perfor-
mances in terms of minimal distance. Of course, in our case, we
do not have freedom in the choice of the generator codewords
as these are dictated only by the network topology
and the established optical channels.
Now, contrary to the use of error-correcting codes for data
transmission, the manager of the network does not require a
unique decoding. Indeed, he/she will prefer to get the set of
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Fig. 5. Binary tree of network shown in Fig. 3 with multiple failures.
all faulty candidates whose domains are close to the received
alarms. In fact, our proposed solution gives all the binary vec-
tors that realize the given alarm mismatching thresholds. For
example, if , it means that we accept a maximum of
alarms to be lost, and therefore the binary vectors that fall
within this margin from the correct codewords are the binary
vectors having a “1” when has “0” in at most po-
sitions. If , it means that we accept a maximum of
false alarms, and therefore the binary vectors that lie within this
margin from the correct codewords are the binary vectors having
“0” when has “1” in at most positions.
Let us illustrate the algorithm with different scenarios on
the example of Fig. 3 when the set of received alarms is
issued by and issued by . Hence,
which corresponds to an empty leaf of
the tree at Fig. 5. Let us check different scenarios.
• : One lost alarm and no false alarms
are tolerated. In this case [see Fig. 6(a)], the output of the
algorithm is the leaf with one mis-
match which corresponds to the two following solutions:
• : One false alarm and no lost alarms
are tolerated. In this case [see Fig. 6(b)], the result is the
leaf and
with one mismatch which correspond to the following four
solutions:
• : One alarm can be lost and another alarm
can be false. In this case (see Fig. 7), the additional re-
sults to the previous ones are the new vectors
and , which correspond to:
In this example, which has only four components, the
tolerance is too loose because it amounts
to accept up to 50% erroneous alarms, and leads to many
sets at each leaf of the tree. In a more realistic
case, the number of active elements is much larger, and
the number of sets pointed by each leaf is much
lower. Hence, the result is more selective.
D. Implementation and Algorithmic Complexity
This algorithm has been implemented in Java and displays
three windows: the input window, which allows entering
the channels, alarms, and mismatching threshold; the result
window, which displays the result of the algorithm, and the
graphical window, which gives a graphical view of the es-
tablished channels highlighting the elements that have issued
alarms and the resulting faulty candidates [17].
Let us now briefly discuss the complexity of the FLA. A more
detailed study can be found in [17]. Time complexity is critical
for a fast diagnosis phase, whereas space complexity is critical
if we have memory space limitations.
Let us begin with time complexity. As mentioned earlier, the
problem of identifying multiple failures is NP complete [1].
However, the computationally intensive part is carried out off-
line, in the precomputation phase (PCP), where all the code-
words, including those accounting for nonideal scenarios, are
determined. As a result, the computation time of the on-line
diagnosis part is kept minimal, proportional to the number of
alarming components , whereas a bound on the worst case
complexity of the part is [17].
However, this minimal time complexity of the diagnosis
phase comes at the expense of space complexity, as all code-
words are explicitly computed and need to be stored. For the
FLA, we have deliberately chosen to minimize time-com-
plexity when alarms are received by the manager. One could
have chosen the opposite approach, and to minimize space
complexity. Indeed it might have been enough to store only
the generator codewords corresponding to single
failures, as all the binary vectors corresponding to multiple
failures, in ideal and nonideal scenarios, are computed from
these. However, remember that this computation is precisely
the NP part of the algorithm which would now need to be
carried out during the diagnosis phase, and no longer off-line
in the , resulting in worse time-complexity. An example
of an algorithm that trades off time complexity for lower
space complexity than the FLA is the alarm filtering algorithm
described in [11].
A question remains open: is it possible to minimize both
time and space complexities? We have already mentioned the
MAS AND THIRAN: EFFICIENT ALGORITHM FOR LOCATING SOFT AND HARD FAILURES IN WDM NETWORKS 1909
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Binary tree accepting mismatches. (a) Binary tree whenm = 1 andm = 0. (b) Binary tree whenm = 0 andm = 1.
Fig. 7. Binary tree whenm = m = 1.
analogy between the FLA and error-correcting codes. Linear
error-correcting codes achieve fast error correction, i.e., have
a good time-complexity, without requiring the computation of
a binary tree, and so have also a good space complexity. This
is achieved thanks to the fact that the set of codewords forming
a linear code is a vector space. Here the set of codewords
does not enjoy this crucial property. It does, however, still pos-
sess a weaker algebraic structure [17], known as a moduloid in
max-plus algebra [19]. Further research will address the possi-
bility of making use of this structure for improving the space
complexity while keeping the time complexity minimal.
VI. SDH/WDM SOFT FAILURE SCENARIOS
We briefly show an example of an SDH/WDM network to il-
lustrate how internetworking may help in locating a progressive
failure, and how the difficulty of setting appropriate thresholds
is (at least partially) alleviated by our algorithm ability to tol-
erate false and missing alarms.
We have modeled three SDH channels (shown in Fig. 8)
using the abstraction of the hardware components and mon-
itoring equipments of Section III-D. The SDH monitoring
elements count erroroneous blocks over time windows of
15 min or 24 h. The error count is reset at each new time
window. Whenever it crosses a threshold, an alarm (“degraded
signal” or “excessive error”) is sent, as specified by the ITU
standard G.783, which assumes either a Poisson distribution or
a bursty distribution of the errored blocks [15].
We adopted here the assumption of Poisson distribution (sim-
ilar results hold for bursty distribution), with two parameters
, where corresponds to the correct functioning (no
failure), and is the situation where a progressive failure has
occurred. We have simulated the time series of the error counts
registered at all the monitoring components (the ones of , ,
and are shown in Fig. 9). The last two should indi-
cate that a soft failure occurred during the fifth time window.
We present the results of the FLA for two different thresholds
. If the threshold is set too high (as is the case
with ), no false alarm is sent, but there are missing alarms.
Running the algorithm with and yields the fol-
lowing output: , ,or . Conversely, if
the threshold is set too low (as is the case with ), no missing
alarm is sent, but false alarms are received. Running the algo-
rithm with and gives the following output: ,
, or .
We note that in both cases the set of faulty candidates pre-
sented to the manager includes the actual faulty elements, but
few correctly working elements. The set of faulty candidates is
therefore both complete and selective, which are two desired
qualities of a fault location method. Note also that the applica-
tion of the algorithm in the ideal scenario would have missed
all faulty candidates in both cases, but that other thresholds may
require higher values of and/or .
Our algorithm can also be adapted to IP/WDM networks and
can cope with soft failures by modeling the IP routers as
elements because they are not masked by any WDM monitoring
equipment at the WDM layer, and they mask failures to the next
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Fig. 8. Modeling of the 3 SDH channels over WDM.
Fig. 9. Block error counting when errors follow a Poisson distribution.
IP router on the channel. An IP router discards packets that do
not verify the checksum. The number of discarded packets is
stored in the MIB variable ifInErrors.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a fault location algorithm (FLA) able to
detect multiple soft and hard failures in a WDM network. This
algorithm improves the previous version implemented in the
COBNET ring network [11].
First, most of the processing time of the second version
of FLA developed in this paper is spent in a precomputation
phase, so that the fault location when alarms are received by
the manager is fast. This makes it particularly appropriate for
large meshed networks, although the advantage for small ring
networks like the ones of COBNET is less critical. The second
attractive feature of our algorithm is the combination of infor-
mation at the WDM layer on hard failures with information at
WDM, SDH, or IP layers on soft failures. The latter failures
are revealed by signals such as BER, for which thresholds
are not easy to set, potentially yielding false or lost alarms.
The robustness of our FLA to these is therefore a third feature
important in practice.
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